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Back to the Future: The Case for Allowing
Citizens to Sue for Wholly Past Violations of
the Emergency Planning and Community
Right-to-Know Act
Adam Biegelt
Although the Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-
Know Act ("EPCRA")' only recently marked its tenth birthday,
environmental, political, and academic leaders praise the law as
a regulatory success.2 EPCRA requires facilities that use or store!
significant amounts of hazardous and toxic substances to inform
government agencies and make information available to the
public about the presence and release into the environment of
such substances.3 The reporting requirements have increased
awareness about dangerous chemicals and facilitated emergency,
planning with relatively minimal costs.4
t B.A. 1993, Emory University; J.D. Candidate 1998, University of Chicago.
' Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986, Title III, Pub L No 99..
499, 100 Stat 1613, 1728-58, codified at 42 USC § 11001 et seq (1994).
2 For environmental perspectives, see Robert W. Shavelson, EPCRA, Citizen Suits
and the Sixth Circuit's Assault of the Public's Right-to-Know, 2 Albany L Envir Outlook
29, 29-30 (Fall 1995) (calling EPCRA "one of the most important and far reaching environ-
mental laws ever enacted"). For political praise, see statement by President Clinton's EPA
Administrator Carol Browner quoted in Sidney M. Wolf, Fear and Loathing About the
Public Right to Know: The Surprising Success of the Emergency Planning and Community
Right-to-Know Act, 11 J Land Use & Envir L 217, 220-21 (1996). For academic perspec.-
tives, see Richard H. Pildes and Cass R. Sunstein, Reinventing the Regulatory State, 62 U
Chi L Rev 1, 106 (1995) (stating there is "reason to believe that the public release of
information about discharge of toxic chemicals has by itself spurred competition to reduce
releases, quite independently of government regulation"). Toxic chemical releases have
been reduced by nearly 43 percent since 1988. Environmental Protection Agency, EPA
Releases 1993 Toxics Release Inventory Data,
<http://www.epa.gov/doca/PressReleases/1995/March/Day-27/pr-257.html> (March 27,
1995).
3 42 USC §§ 11002, 11004, 11021-23.
' Although some small businesses have criticized EPCRA's compliance costs, the
law's overall information collection and dissemination system remains relatively uncom-
plicated. See generally Wolf, 11 J Land Use & Envir L 217 (cited in note 2). The EPA
released the first compilation of EPCRA data in 1989, and'observers were shocked to
learn that billions of pounds of toxic emissions were released in 1987. Id at 280-84, 307-
11. See also Henry A. Waxman, An Overview of the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990, 21
Envir L 1721, 1731 n 28 (1991). This reaction led "an orgy of voluntary emissions cuts,"
expansion of EPCRA's usage, and the Bush Administration's emission reduction program.
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Courts, however, disagree about the boundaries of the citizen
suit enforcement of the statute.5 Under EPCRA, a would-be
citizen enforcer must notify the alleged violator, state authorities,
and the federal Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA"), and
then wait 60 days before filing suit.' The legal dispute concerns
whether facilities that have failed to file the required disclosure
documents can avoid liability from citizen suits if they come into
compliance during this 60-day period. In other words, can citi-
zens sue for past violations of the act? Every court that con-
fronted the issue prior to 1995 answered this question in the
affirmative,7 but two circuit courts considering the issue since
then have split on the question.8
This Comment weighs the merits of the conflicting positions
on EPCRA and explains the rationale for a broad private right of
action for past violations. Part I examines EPCRA's provisions,
the use and interpretation of citizen suit mechanisms in other
environmental statutes, and the debate over EPCRA citizen suits.
Part II then looks to the text, structure, origins, and practical use
of EPCRA to argue for private enforcement for past violations.
The Comment concludes that EPCRA's essence is timely disclo-
sure enforced by community vigilance, which would erode if past
violations were not actionable.
I. EPCRA AND ITS CITIZEN SUIT PROVISIONS
The Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know
Act9 represents a concise legislative response to environmental
concerns. The statute aims to increase both local planning for
emergencies involving toxic chemicals and citizen awareness of
the substances in their communities through mandatory report-
Jessica Matthews, An Opening for Environmentalists, Wash Post A15 (Apr 16, 1996);
Wolf, 11 J Land Use & Envir L at 295-308 (cited in note 2).
' Compare Citizens for a Better Environment v Steel Co., 90 F3d 1237 (7th Cir 1996),
with Atlantic States Legal Foundation, Inc. v United Musical Instruments, 61 F3d 473
(6th Cir 1995). The United States Supreme Court granted a petition for certiorari in the
Steel Co. case, No 96-643, on February 24, 1997. 117 S Ct 1079 (1997). The case was
argued on October 6, 1997.
6 42 USC § 11046(d).
7 Delaware Valley Toxics Coalition v Kurz-Hastings, Inc., 813 F Supp 1132 (E D Pa
1993); Williams v Leybold Technologies, Inc., 784 F Supp 765 (N D Cal 1992); Atlantic
States Legal Foundation, Inc. v Whiting Roll-Up Door Manufacturing Corp., 772 F Supp
745 (W D NY 1991); Atlantic States Legal Foundation, Inc. v Buffalo Envelope Co., 1991
WL 183772 (W D NY 1991).
Steel Co., 90 F3d 1237; United Musical Instruments, 61 F3d 473.
42 USC § 11001 et seq (1994).
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ing requirements." Like nearly all modern environmental stat-
utes," EPCRA permits "citizen suits," private actions against
those who violate the statute or the government for inadequate
enforcement. 2 Courts have differed, however, over what actions
these "private attorneys general"" can prosecute."
A. EPCRA and Its Origins
Congress enacted EPCRA as a response to the perception.
that the nation was not adequately prepared for an accidental
release of hazardous chemicals into the environment. 5 Its re-
quirements and mechanisms were designed with the understand-
ing that communities and citizens would benefit from information
about hazardous substances. 6
1. Emergency planning.
On the emergency planning side, EPCRA requires communi-
ty planning and industry communication about releases. EPCRA.
first provides for the establishment of emergency response com-
missions and emergency planning committees at the state and.
local levels, respectively. 7 The local committees must work with
facilities at which minimum quantities of "extremely dangerous
substances""8 are present and develop plans to respond to catas-
trophes.9 When a facility that produces, uses, or stores certain
10 Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986, HR Conf Rep No 99-962.,
99th Cong, 2d Sess 281 (1986), reprinted in 1986 USCCAN 3374.
" See, for example, Clean Water Act, 33 USC § 1365(a) (1994); Solid Waste Disposal
Act, 42 USC § 6972(a) (1994); Clean Air Act, 42 USC § 7604(a) (1994).
12 42 USC § 11046.
" Significant literature exists on citizens enforcing environmental statutes. See
James M. Hecker, The Citizen's Role in Environmental Enforcement: Private Attorney
General, Private Citizen, or Both?, 8 Natural Resource & Envir 31 (1994); Peter H..
Lehner, The Efficiency of Citizens Suits, 2 Albany L Envir Outlook 4 (Fall 1995); Michael.
S. Greve, The Private Enforcement of Environmental Law, 65 Tulane L Rev 339 (1990).
" Compare Citizens for a Better Environment v Steel Co., 90 F3d 1237 (7th Cir 1996),
with Atlantic States Legal Foundation, Inc. v United Musical Instruments, 61 F3d 473
(6th Cir 1995).
15 See Statement of Senator Lautenberg, 131 Cong Rec S 18388-94 (Dec 19, 1985).
Congress enacted EPCRA in the wake of two widely publicized chemical accidents in
Bhopal, India, and Institute, West Virginia. Sidney M. Wolf, Fear and Loathing About the
Public Right to Know: The Surprising Success of the Emergency Planning and Community
Right-to-Know Act, 11 J Land Use & Envir L 217, 218-19 (1996).
16 HR Conf Rep No 99-962 at 281, reprinted in 1986 USCCAN 3374 (cited in note 10).
' 42 USC § 11001.
EPCRA requires that the EPA publish a list of these substances. 42 USC
§ 11002(aX2).
'9 42 USC §§ 11002-11003. Emergency plans must include certain elements and be
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amounts of these or other chemicals20 releases21 them outside
the facility, the statute requires the facility's owners or operators
to inform the emergency planning bodies immediately.22 As soon
as possible after the emergency, the facility must update its re-
port, detail its response to the release, and describe the health
risks of the release.2
2. The right-to-know.
EPCRA's "right-to-know" requirements mandate an unprece-
dented regimen of information collection and dissemination prior
to emergencies.' Facilities that house "hazardous chemicals' 2
must file and update Material Safety Data Sheets with the plan-
ning groups and local fire departments detailing the names and
hazardous components of these chemicals.2' The EPA may modi-
fy reporting thresholds, but Congress intended EPCRA data
sheets to parallel OSHA data sheets.2 ' These documents are
available to the public through local planning committees.'m
In addition, the statute requires companies to file annual
chemical inventory and toxic release forms.'m The chemical in-
ventory form must include the type, location, and maximum and
average daily quantities of the chemicals identified in the data
publicly available. 42 USC §§ 11003(c), 11044.
o Releases of some substances not labeled "extremely dangerous" under EPCRA, 42
USC § 11002(a), are governed by the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compen-
sation and Liability Act of 1980 ("CERCLA"), 42 USC § 9601 et seq (1994), and also
trigger emergency notification requirements. 42 USC § 11004(aX3). CERCLA also de-
termines relevant release thresholds for trigger of EPCRA's notice provisions. 42 USC
§ 11004(aXl)-(2).
21 EPCRA defines a "release" as "any spilling, leaking, pumping, pouring, emitting,
emptying, discharging, injecting, escaping, leaching, dumping, or disposing into the envi-
ronment... of any hazardous chemical, extremely hazardous substance, or toxic chemi-
cal." 42 USC § 11049(8).
2' 42 USC § 11004.
42 USC § 11004(c).
2, Wolf, 11 J Land Use & Envir L at 220-21 (cited in note 15).
Hazardous chemicals are generally defined by the Occupational Safety and Health
Act, 29 USC § 651 et seq (1994), and its regulations. 42 USC § 11021.
' 42 USC § 11021. In August 1993, President Clinton signed an executive order sub-
jecting federal facilities to EPCRA's requirements. Exec Order No 12856, 3 CFR 616
(1993).
27 42 USC § 11021. EPCRA exempts products used by consumers and in most re-
search, medical, and routine agricultural capacities. 42 USC § 11021(e). Parallels to
OSHA requirements exist for EPCRA inventory forms as well. 42 USC § 11022.
' 42 USC § 11021(c)-(d). For public availability and notice requirements of EPCRA
documents generally, see 42 USC § 11044.
29 42 USC §§ 11022-11023. The statute requires the filing of the preceding year's in-
formation on specific dates, March 1 and July 1, respectively. Id. The EPA can adjust the
frequency of toxic release forms. 42 USC § 11023(i).
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sheet.3" Companies must file this form with the planning groups
and local fire departments.31
The toxic release form requires facilities using or manufac-
turing specified "toxic chemicals"32 to detail the amount and
method of disposal during the previous year.33 Companies file
this "release form," commonly known as "Form R,"3 with the
EPA and state officials, who must make it available to the pub-
lic.3" In addition, the EPA must maintain a public database with
reported release information accessible via computer.36 As with
all documents required by EPCRA, a facility may withhold infor-
mation such as a specific chemical identity that the EPA deems a
bona fide trade secret.
3. Enforcement.
The law includes two primary enforcement mechanisms.
First, the government can use civil, administrative, and criminal
penalties.' The second enforcement section, the subject of this
Comment, involves citizen suits. Generally, any person or organi-
zation 9 can bring these actions. EPCRA provides that:
[A]ny person may commence a civil action on his own
behalf against the following:
(A) An owner or operator of a facility for failure to
do any of the following:
42 USC § 11022(c), (d).
" Two different "tiers" or methods of presenting this information can fulfill this re-
quirement. 42 USC §§ 11022(c), (d). The public can compel the more detailed version,
called "Tier II," to be filed. 42 USC § 11022(d), (e3).
32 The statute references a list of these chemicals published by the Senate Committee
on Environment and Public Works and authorizes the EPA to add substances based on
health effects. 42 USC § 11023 (c), (dX2). See 40 CFR § 372.65 (1995).
3 42 USC § 11023. This provision was not intended to require new monitoring
requirements, but instead to overlap with other regulatory requirements. 42 USC
§ 11023(g)(2).
3 40 CFR § 372.85 (1995).
42 USC § 11023(a), (h).
42 USC § 11023(j). The EPA Toxic Release Inventory is available through the
National Library of Medicine's TOXNET system.
37 42 USC § 11042. EPCRA includes provisions concerning the determinative factors,
exemptions, and availability of information regarding trade secrets. 42 USC §§ 11042(b),
(f), (h), 11043.
3 42 USC § 11045. Penalties can include fines of up to $25,000. Id. Criminal penal-
ties apply only to emergency reporting requirements and disclosure of trade secrets. Id.
3' A person is defined as "any individual, trust, firm, joint stock company, corpora-
tion ... partnership, association, State, municipality, commission, political subdivision of
a State, or interstate body." 42 USC § 11049(7).
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(i) Submit a follow-up emergency notice under
section 11004(c) of this title.
(ii) Submit a material safety data sheet or a list
under section 11021(a) of this title.
(iii) Complete and submit an inventory form
under section 11022(a) of this title containing
tier I information as described in section
11022(d)(1) of this title unless such requirement
does not apply by reason of the second sentence
of section 11022(a)(2) of this title.
(iv) Complete and submit a toxic chemical re-
lease form under section 11023(a) of this ti-
tle.'
Citizens can also sue the EPA for failing to promulgate regula-
tions and publish documents,"' and state officials and the EPA
for not making information publicly available.42 State and local
governments may also sue owners and operators and the EPA."
Although EPCRA limits a citizen's ability to file and profit
from a suit, legal actions can lead to substantial litigation ex-
pense awards or settlements for citizens." The only limitations
on citizen suits are requirements of minimal geographic ties for
venue; a 60-day waiting period after notifying the EPA, state
authorities, and the alleged violator; and an exclusivity order
when the United States "has commenced and is diligently pursu-
ing" a penalty or order for the same alleged violation.45 In suits
against facility owners and operators, citizens may seek court
orders requiring compliance and imposition of "any civil penalty
provided for violation of that requirement.' Violators must de-
posit these amounts in the United States Treasury because all
liability is to the federal government.47 However, courts may
award litigation costs, including attorney and expert witness
fees.' These awards can encourage plaintiffs to invest in moni-
toring and identifying violations. 49 Settlements have included
40 42 USC § 11046(aXl).
41 42 USC § 11046(aXlXB).
42 42 USC § 11046(aX1XC). State officials are also liable for not seeking requested
Tier II information. 42 USC § 11046(aXIXD).
4 42 USC § 11046(aX2).
- 42 USC § 11046(f).
45 42 USC § 11046(b), (d), (e).
' 42 USC § 11046(c).
4' 42 USC § 11045.
42 USC § 11046(f).
49 Steel Co., 90 F3d at 1244. ("EPCRA creates a structure that encourages private
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substantial environmental auditing, compliance agreements,
public awareness campaign commitments, and charitable contri-
butions to local environmental groups."°
B. Citizen Suit Provisions in Other Environmental Statutes
The use of citizen suit provisions in environmental law sur-
faced more than two decades ago,"' and Congress has continued
to use them widely. Most statutes in this area, including EPCRA,
include similar provisions concerning standing, requirements,
and relief 2 Given the typically parallel goals and language of
citizen suit provisions in environmental statutes, litigants and
courts often look to apply common principles or analysis within
this area's case law."
One element originally shared by several citizen suit provi-
sions allows citizens to bring suits against those "alleged to be in
violation" of statutory or regulatory requirements." Under the
Clean Water Act ("CWA") a conflict developed over whether this
language allowed suits for past violations.55 In Gwaltney of
Smithfield, Ltd. v Chesapeake Bay Foundation, the Supreme
Court resolved this conflict finding the statute to allow suits for
continuous and intermittent violations, but not wholly past
ones.
5 6
The Court deemed this interpretation the "most natural
reading" of the words because Congress appeared to have deliber-
citizens to invest the resources necessary to uncover violations of the Act by allowing
courts to award the costs of enforcement to prevailing or substantially prevailing par-
ties."). See Wolf, 11 J Land Use & Envir L at 277-280 n 357 (cited in note 15).
61 Clean Air Amendments of 1970, Pub L No 91-604, 84 Stat 1676, codified at 42 USC
§ 7401 et seq (1994).
" For a good overview of this area of the law, see Karl S. Coplan, Private Enforce.
ment of Federal Pollution Control Laws: The Citizen Suit, in ALI-ABA, Environmental
Litigation 1033 (1996).
' See, for example, Atlantic States Legal Foundation, Inc. v United Musical Instru-
ments, 61 F3d 473, 475-76 (6th Cir 1995); Atlantic States Legal Foundation, Inc. v Whiting
Roll-Up Door Manufacturing Corp., 772 F Supp 745, 751-52 (W D NY 1991); Delaware
Valley Toxics Coalition v Kurz-Hastings, Inc., 813 F Supp 1132, 1141 (E D Pa 1993).
' Clean Air Act, 42 USC § 7604(a)(1) (1988), amended by Clean Air Act Amendments
of 1990 § 707(g), Pub L No 101-548, 104 Stat 2574, 2683; Clean Water Act, 42 USC
§ 1365(aXl) (1994); Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, 42 USC § 6972(aX1XA
(1982), amended by Hazardous and Solid Waste Amendments of 1984 § 401, Pub L No 98..
616, 98 Stat 3221, 3268-71.
' Pawtuxet Cove Marina, Inc. v CIBA-GEIGY Corp., 807 F2d 1089 (1st Cir 1986);
Chesapeake Bay Foundation, Inc. v Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd., 791 F2d 304 (4th Cir
1986); Hamker v Diamond Shamrock Chemical Co., 756 F2d 392 (5th Cir 1985).5" 484 US 49, 57 (1987)
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ately used the present-tense phrase in most environmental stat-
utes.57 The Court suggested Congress could have used the words
"[alleged] to have violated" if it meant to include past viola-
tions."M The Court also noted that Congress used a similarly spe-
cific phrase when it amended portions of the Solid Waste Dispos-
al Act in 1984 previously added by the Resource Conservation
and Recovery Act ("RCRA). 59 Congress replaced the "to be in
violation" language with a provision creating liability for one
"who has contributed to or who is contributing" to a "past or
present" act." The Court argued the amendment created a neg-
ative implication regarding the CWA.6"
Moreover, the Court found the "pervasive use of the present
tense throughout" the CWA's citizen suit section made it "primar-
ily forward-looking." 2 The Court noted that without requiring
an ongoing or likelihood of future violation, the notice provision
would not make sense because violators would not be able to use
the period to come into compliance and citizens could supplant
the government's decision to forgo litigation.'
Finally, the Court emphasized congressional characteriza-
tions of the suit provisions as "abatement" methods modeled after
those in the Clean Air Act ("CAA"), which provided for injunctive
relief.6 Thus, the Court held that requiring a "good-faith allega-
tion of continuous intermittent violation" would allow reasonable
claims to go forward while protecting defendants from moot ac-
tions."
Gwaltney marked an important point in citizen suit jurispru-
dence." In its aftermath, courts closely scrutinized and often
rejected citizen suits for wholly past violations of the CWA and
CWA-like statutes. 7 In addition, Congress amended the CAA in
57 Id.
Id.
89 484 US at 57 n 2.
" Hazardous and Solid Waste Amendments of 1984 § 401, Pub L No 98-616, 98 Stat
3221, 3268-71, codified at 42 USC § 6972(aXIXB) (1994).
" 484 US at 57 n 2.
62 Id at 59.
Id at 59-61. See also Hallstrom v Tillamook County, 493 US 20, 29, 31 (1989) (60-
day notice provisions for RCRA citizen suits are "mandatory conditions precedent").
484 US at 61-62.
Id at 64-67.
For discussions of Gwaltney's impact, see Charles N. Nauen, Citizen Environmental
Lawsuits After Gwaltney: The Thrill of Victory or the Agony of Defeat?, 15 Wm Mitchell L
Rev 327 (1989); Beverly McQueary Smith, The Viability of Citizens' Suits Under the Clean
Water Act After Gwaltney of Smithfield v Chesapeake Bay Foundation, 40 Case W Re-
serve L Rev 1 (1990).
67 For use of the Gwaltney "continuing or intermittent violation" formulation, see At-
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1990 in response to Gwaltney." The prior "alleged to be in viola-
tion" language was changed to allow a citizen suit against anyone
"alleged to have violated (if there is evidence that the alleged
violation has been repeated) or to be in violation" of an emission
standard or order6 9 Courts have allowed citizen suits for wholly
past violations under this provision.7"
C. EPCRA and Past Violations
EPCRA serves as the latest battleground over past-violation
suits. While many trial courts have found EPCRA analytically
different from the CWA, circuit courts have disagreed about
whether Gwaltney should be extended to prohibit citizen suits for
past violations under EPCRA as well.71
1. The district court cases.
Once citizens began filing suit under EPCRA during the
1990s, one of the common objections to the citizen suits involved
the right of a private litigant to recover for wholly past viola-
tions. 2
The first case on this issue, Atlantic States Legal Foundation
v Whiting Roll-Up Door Manufacturing Corporation,73 interpret-
ed EPCRA's language and history to allow suits for past viola-
lantic States Legal Foundation, Inc. v Pan American Tanning Corp., 807 F Supp 230 (N D
NY 1992), revd 993 F2d 1017 (2d Cir 1993) (CWA); Pennsylvania Environmental Defense
Foundation v Bellafonte Borough, 718 F Supp 431 (M D Pa 1989) (CWA); Lutz v
Chromatex, Inc., 718 F Supp 413 (M D Pa 1989) (CERCLA); McClellan Ecological Seepage
Situation (MESS) v Weinberger, 707 F Supp 1182 (E D Cal 1988) (RCRA); Comite Pro
Rescate De La Salud v Puerto Rico Aqueduct and Sewer Authority, 693 F Supp 1324 (D
PR 1988), vacated on other grounds, 888 F2d 180 (1st Cir 1989) (CAA).
Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990 § 707(g), 104 Stat 2574, 2683 (cited in note 54).
For discussion of the amendments, see Henry A. Waxman, An Overview of the Clean Air
Act Amendments of 1990, 21 Envir L 1721, 1747-48 (1991).
6 42 USC § 7604(aX 1).
7' Fried v Sungard Recovery Services, 916 F Supp 465 (E D Pa 1996); Glazer v Ameri-
can Ecology Environmental Services Corp., 894 F Supp 1029 (E D Tex 1995). But see
Satterfield v J.M. Huber Corp., 888 F Supp 1561 (N D Ga 1994) (reading the amendments
to the CAA as incorporating, not overruling, Gwaltney).
7 Compare Citizens for a Better Environment v Steel Co., 90 F3d 1237 (7th Cir 1996),
with Atlantic States Legal Foundation, Inc. v United Musical Instruments, 61 F3d 473
(6th Cir 1995).
72 Few suits were filed in the 1980s, partly because EPCRA's first deadlines were in
1988. 42 USC §§ 11003(a), 11022(aX2), 11023(a). For a discussion of common objections,
see Robert W. Shavelson, EPCRA, Citizen Suits and the Sixth Circuit's Assault of the
Public's Right-to-Know, 2 Albany L Envir Outlook 29, 33-35 (Fall 1995).
7' 772 F Supp 745 (W D NY 1991) (involving a door manufacturing facility in Akron,
New York, that filed delinquent data sheets, inventory forms, and release forms after re-
ceiving notice but before the plaintiff filed suit).
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tions. The court held that the reporting deadlines were mandato-
ry requirements, the violation of which could result in a "failure"
actionable under EPCRA. 74 The court noted that EPCRA's au-
thorization of civil penalties against "any person.., who violates
any requirement 75 of the statute reinforced this reading.76 Fur-
ther, the court held that filing delays undermined Congress's
"two fundamental objectives" of increasing publicly available
information and developing emergency response plans,7 noting
that achieving these objectives "depends on accurate and current
information."78 In addition, the court distinguished EPCRA's cit-
izen suit provision from the CWA provision analyzed in
Gwaltney.79 The court noted that the plain language of EPCRA's
citizen suit provision' leads to a different "natural reading"
than that of the CWA because of the statutes' different uses of
verb tenses." EPCRA also did not include "pervasive use of the
present tense," which might limit suits only to ongoing viola-
tions.8  The court further held that Congress's amendment of
the CAA to authorize some past violation suits "undercuts the
importance of the Supreme Court's discussion in Gwaltney that
Congress would not have placed such a notice provision in a stat-
ute where it also intended authorize [sic] citizen suits for past
violations. "'
Subsequent district courts echoed this analysis and result. In
Williams v Leybold Technologies, Inc.,' the court found Whiting
Roll-Up Door's reasoning "sound and fully applicable" to a case
involving data sheets filed after they were due but before a citi-
zen filed suit.' The court distinguished EPCRA from the CWA
and emphasized that timely data sheets are "a critical first step"
7 Id at 750.
42 USC § 11045(cXl),(2).
772 F Supp at 750.
" Id at 751.
78 Id.
71 Id at 752-53.
80 42 USC § 11046(aX1) (allowing citizen suits against owners or operators "for
failure to" comply with EPCRA's reporting requirements).
SI 772 F Supp at 752.
82 Id at 752-53. The Whiting Roll-Up Door court cited the use of the past-tense in
EPCRA's venue section referring to a place where "the alleged violation occurred." Id at
753, citing 42 USC § 11046(bXl).
83 Id at 753.
'4 784 F Supp 765 (N D Cal 1992) (involving an employee who sued a San Jose,
California, manufacturer that used amounts of nickel and nickel compounds between 1986
and 1990).
" Id at 768.
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in information dissemination and emergency planning."s
EPCRA's legislative history and plain language compelled the
court to recognize citizen suits for past violations. 7 Similarly,
the court in Delaware Valley Toxics Coalition v Kurz-Hastings,
Inc. relied on this line of cases to permit a suit concerning wholly
past violations involving release forms." In Kurz-Hastings, the
court again distinguished Gwaltney by saying the CWA and
EPCRA language "differ." 9 The court also pointed out that after
the CAA amendments, notice requirements are "not at odds" with
past violation suits."
2. The Sixth Circuit's approach.
In 1995, the Sixth Circuit disrupted the prior unanimous
agreement on the availability of citizen suits for wholly past
violations. In Atlantic States Legal Foundation, Inc. v United
Musical Instruments,"' the court held that EPCRA does not al-
low citizen suits for past violations cured before the suit.9 2 First,
the Sixth Circuit held that although EPCRA sets filing deadlines,
the phrase "failure to... complete and submit" a release form
prevents citizens from prosecuting late submissions: "The form is
completed and filed even when it is not timely filed."93 According
to the court, only the EPA, which Congress empowered to seek
civil penalties, could file suit in such cases."4 Second, the court
found that Gwaltney supported this interpretation.95 As with the
CWA, allowing suits for past violations would not permit the
alleged violator to come into compliance during the notice period
and would risk supplanting the EPA's enforcement role."
The Sixth Circuit also rejected arguments the plaintiff and
others had made successfully in previous EPCRA cases. The
court dismissed the Whiting Roll-Up Door court's "natural
reading" interpretation of EPCRA's tenses as "hypertechnical
Id.
'7 Id.
813 F Supp 1132, 1141 (E D Pa 1993) (involving a decorative foil manufacturing
plant in Northeast Philadelphia required to file Form Rs between 1988 and 1992).
Id at 1141.
9' Id.
91 61 F3d 473 (6th Cir 1995) (involving a musical instrument manufacturer's facility
in Eastlake, Ohio, that filed late release forms for 1988 through 1991 after receiving a
notice of suit but prior to a suit being filed).
9 Id at 475.
Id, citing 42 USC § 11046(aX1XAXiv).
Id, citing 42 USC § 11045(c)(4).
61 F3d at 475.
Id at 476.
406 1,HE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LEGAL FORUM [1997:
parsing."97 It relied instead on the Supreme Court's statement
in Gwaltney that "Congress could have phrased its requirements
in language that looked to the past" but did not.98 The Sixth
Circuit also ruled that although the post-Gwaltney CAA
amendment might diminish the significance of notice periods,
Congress's failure to amend EPCRA could mean that EPCRA
limited citizen suits to those for ongoing violations."9 Finally,
the Sixth Circuit noted that its interpretation satisfied
Congress's intent to provide the public information: "Once the
forms providing the information have been filed, this congressio-
nal goal has been achieved, and an enforcement suit is unneces-
sary."
100
In late 1995, an Illinois district court in Citizens for a Better
Environment v Steel Co.'0' held that the Sixth Circuit's decision
"cast doubt" on the earlier cases.'l 2 The court agreed that
EPCRA emphasized the "completion and submission" of forms
over specific deadlines and distinguished between citizen and
EPA enforcement privileges concerning past violations. 3 The
district court also approved of the Sixth Circuit's application of
Gwaltney to EPCRA and its interpretation of the CAA amend-
ments, noting that the plaintiffs "attempt to uncover a flaw in
the Musical Instruments court's reasoning is... unavailing."'"°
3. The Seventh Circuit's approach.
In the only other EPCRA decision by an appellate court, the
Seventh Circuit reversed the Illinois court's decision in Steel Co.,
thereby creating a circuit split. 5 Although recognizing that the
case was "factually indistinguishable" from United Musical In-
struments, the court rejected the Sixth Circuit's reasoning in
favor of the logic of the Whiting Roll-Up Door line of cases1.
The Seventh Circuit faulted the Sixth Circuit's decision for
applying the "literal holding" and not the "interpretive methodol-
Id at 477.
Id, quoting Gwaltney, 484 US at 57.
61 F3d at 477.
10 Id.
'0 1995 US Dist LEXIS 18948 (N D I1) (involving a manufacturer and pickler of steel
on the South Side of Chicago that had not fied any inventory or release forms between
1988 and 1995).
Id at *7.
'03 Id at *7-*9.
Id at *9-*10.
'0' Citizens for a Better Environment v Steel Co., 90 F3d 1237 (7th Cir 1996).
6 Id at 1241-43.
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ogy" of Gwaltney to EPCRA.1°7 According to the court, EPCRA's
language differs from that of the CWA because it "contains no
temporal limitation; 'failure to do' something can indicate a fail-.
ure past or present.""~s In addition, the Seventh Circuit ruled.
that the Sixth Circuit's emphasis on the words "complete and.
submit" was misplaced."° Rather, the court argued, the ensuing
phrases such as "under section 11022(a)", which includes filing
requirements and deadlines, expressed Congress's intent to incor-
porate reporting deadlines into the right of action.1 Likewise,
legislative history reflecting the need for timely reporting and
disclosure supported this argument."
The Seventh Circuit went on to distinguish the structure and
notice provisions of EPCRA and the CWA.112 Noting that
"[n]owhere does EPCRA contain the 'is occurring' language of the
CWA to indicate that citizens must allege an ongoing viola-
tion,"' the court interpreted EPCRA's phrasing as a deliberate
congressional choice."1 The court also claimed that Gwaltney's
conception of the notice period was "no longer as compelling" af-
ter the CAA amendments allowed past violation suits while pre-
serving the notice period provision.1 5 The court also offered log-
ical alternative uses for the notice period: allowing a defendant to
correct a plaintiffs information or limit its exposure by filing late
reports, maintaining an opportunity for the EPA to take enforce-
ment action, or encouraging settlement negotiations."' Finally,
the court observed that litigants could rarely recoup the costs of
compliance monitoring under the Sixth Circuit's approach, mak-
ing citizen suits "virtually meaningless." 7
In the only cases decided after the circuit split, district
courts in Arizona, Idaho, and Colorado sided. with the Seventh
Circuit. In Don't Waste Arizona, Inc. v McLane Foods, Inc.,
an Arizona court reviewed the caselaw and concluded that the
Seventh Circuit "has embraced the better reasoned approach to
107 Id at 1242.
108 Id at 1243.
19 90 F3d at 1243.
.. Id at 1243, citing 42 USC § 11046(aX1XA)(iii).
. Id at 1243 n 2.
112 Id at 1243-44.
" 90 F3d at 1244.
114 Id at 1244.
1 Id.
116 Id.
17 90 F3d at 1244.
950 F Supp 972 (D Ariz 1996).
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statutory construction."' 9 The court held that EPCRA did not
need to be amended like the CAA to allow past violation suits,
the statute did not implicitly restrict courts' jurisdiction over
such suits, and no words in the statute were inconsistent with
past-violation suits."2 In addition, the District Court echoed the
Seventh Circuit's incentive-based policy arguments, concluding
that past violation suits provide the only effective citizen supple-
ment to EPA enforcement. 2 ' Similarly, in Idaho Sporting Con-
gress v Computrol, Inc."2 and Neighbors for a Toxic Free Commu-
nity v Vulcan Materials Co."'8, Idaho and Colorado courts en-
dorsed the Seventh Circuit's reading of EPCRA.
II. RESOLVING THE CIRCUIT SPLIT OVER EPCRA
As noted in Part I, courts that have examined the EPCRA
past violation issue have given starkly different answers. On one
hand, the Sixth Circuit applied the Supreme Court's restrictive
interpretation of the CWA's citizen suit provisions to prohibit pri-
vate actions under EPCRA for purely historical violations.1"' On
the other hand, the Seventh Circuit distinguished EPCRA from
the CWA and allowed past violation suits.2 '
After weighing the merits of the conflicting circuit court
positions, this Comment argues for the broad private right of
action for past violations endorsed by the Seventh Circuit. This
Comment expands on the Seventh Circuit's arguments in Steel
Co. concerning language, structure, congressional intent, and
incentives and then blends them with a perspective on the use-
fulness of citizen enforcement, a policy view of EPCRA's enforce-
ment, and other supporting views.
A. The Text Authorizing Citizen Suits Under EPCRA
As both the Sixth and Seventh Circuits noted, statutory
interpretation begins with an analysis of plain language. 2 '
They disagreed, however, on what that plain language meant. A
19 Id at 976.
' Id at 976-79.
121 Id at 979.
952 F Supp 690, 692-93 (D Idaho 1996).
'23 964 F Supp 1448, 1452-53 (D Colo 1997).
'4 Atlantic States Legal Foundation, Inc. v United Musical Instruments, 61 F3d 473
(6th Cir 1995).
- Citizens for a Better Environment v Steel Co., 90 F3d 1237 (7th Cir 1996).
'2 Steel Co., 90 F3d at 1242; United Musical Instruments, 61 F3d at 475.
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common-sense reading of EPCRA, however, must allow actions
for past violations because of its phrasing, especially in compar-
ison to differently worded environmental statutes. Without such
an interpretation, EPCRA's mesh of deadlines and mandatory
notice periods would prevent most citizen suits.
Consider a typical EPCRA "past violation" suit. Assume that
(1) Citizen A discovers Facility X did not file a required chemical
release form by July 1, 1998, (2) the citizen properly notifies
Facility X and others on August 1 of his intent to sue, (3) Facility
X fies the form on September 15, and (4) Citizen A files suit
against Facility X on October 15 after the Environmental Protec-
tion Agency decides not to act. Thus, the violator is in compliance
when the suit is filed. Does EPCRA authorize this suit?
A single EPCRA provision governs the viability of such a
citizen suit. The statute provides that "any person may com-
mence a civil action on his own behalf against.., an owner or
operator of a facility for failure to... [clomplete and submit a
toxic chemical release form under section 11023(a) of this ti-
tle."1
27
EPCRA's words, best understood, give meaning to each other.
Although the word "failure" might "indicate a failure past or
present,""2 it does not carry a conclusive meaning. An ordinary
use of the word, as in "I failed to do something," can easily carry
the logical connotation that that failure continues. Thus, a natu-
ral reading of "failure" does not resolve the issue. Nor does em-
phasizing the words "complete and submit a toxic chemical re-
lease form""2 end the analysis because the sentence does not
end there. It continues with "under section 11023(a) of this ti-
tle." This citation is crucial because the referenced section in-
cludes the due date for the form. 1 '
A plain language reading suggests that the deadline date is
an integral part of the statute. The Seventh Circuit reached this
conclusion, saying that "under" means "in accordance with the
requirements of."" 2 Thus, the deadlines are "essential elements
of the provisions citizens have authority to enforce."' 33
'2' 42 USC § 11046(aX1).
See Steel Co., 90 F3d at 1243.
19 See United Musical Instruments, 61 F3d at 475.
42 USC § 11046(aXIXAXiv).
42 USC § 11023(a).
132, Steel Co., 90 F3d at 1243.
133 Id.
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Furthermore, the reference to "under section 11023(a)"'"
serves as more than a means of identifying the type of form. If
Congress meant to omit past violation actions, it could have ref-
erenced a definition of the form elsewhere. The functional defini-
tions of a release form included in Section 11023(a)-Sections
11023(c), (g), and (f)'--could have been included in the citizen
suit section without additional verbiage. Or a definition of the
form could have been included in the statute's definition list
without mention of a due date."6 Congress took neither of these
steps, each of which would have avoided including the deadline
by reference. The detailed assignment of the EPA's liability for
not complying with other portions of this section adds weight to
this theory. 13 7
In addition, plain language does not function in a caselaw
vacuum. Congress included citizen suit provisions in environmen-
tal laws for sixteen years prior to EPCRA, and most were essen-
tially identical." They included references to violators "alleged
to be in violation."' 9 The Supreme Court ruled after EPCRA's
passage that this language did not cover wholly past violations,
saying, "Congress could have phrased its requirement in lan-
guage that looked to the past ('to have violated'), but it did not
choose this readily available option.""
The Sixth Circuit ignored the timetable of these legal devel-
opments and incorrectly applied the Court's Gwaltney holding in
a mechanical fashion to preclude past violation suits. 1" Given
the consistent phrasing of the pre-EPCRA citizen suit provisions,
EPCRA's new terminology-"failure to do" instead of "be in viola-
tion"--can be seen as an attempt to permit the retrospective
application to which the Court referred.42 The circuit split re-
42 USC § 11046(aX1XAXiv).
'" These subsections describe the chemicals covered, relevant threshold quantities,
and the form's elements. 42 USC § 11023.
' 42 USC § 11049.
137 42 USC § 11046(aX1XBXii), (iii), (iv).
'3" For a list of environmental citizen suit provisions, see Delaware Valley Toxics
Coalition v Kurz.Hastings, Inc., 813 F Supp 1132, 1137 n 4 (E D Pa 1993) (citing twelve
statutes).
"3 Clean Air Act, 42 USC § 7604(aX1) (1988), amended by Clean Air Act Amendments
of 1990 § 707(g), Pub L No 101-548, 104 Stat 2574, 2683; Clean Water Act, 42 USC
§ 1365(aXl) (1994); Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, 42 USC § 6972(aX1XA)
(1982), amended by Hazardous and Solid Waste Amendments of 1984 § 401, Pub L No 98-
616, 98 Stat 3221, 3268-71.
140 Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd. v Chesapeake Bay Foundation, 484 US 49, 57 (1987).
i41 United Musical Instruments, 61 F3d at 476-77.
12 Gwaltney, 484 US at 57.
395] EPCRA CITIZEN SUITS FOR PAST VIOLATIONS 411
garding past violations of the CWA at the time EPCRA was en-
acted adds to this logic. EPCRA's authors in 1986 could not pres-
age the exact words of the 1987 Gwaltney opinion. Every court
that confronted this issue between Gwaltney and United Musical
Instruments observed this difference in EPCRA." These con-
clusions did not represent "hypertechnical parsing."'"
Additionally, this historical understanding of EPCRA under-
cuts the Sixth Circuit's interpretation of the 1990 Clean Air Act
amendments, which added past violations to the "in violation"
language.1' Instead of showing "Congress intended to limit
EPCRA's citizen suit provision" to ongoing violations by not
amending EPCRA,'" the amendments left a backward-looking
statute untouched.
B. The Structure of EPCRA's Citizen Suit Provision
The next logical inquiry involves other provisions of EPCRA
related to citizen suits, including words within the section itself
and those referenced by it. An analysis of these provisions in
light of Supreme Court decisions, other statutes, and congressio-
nal activity bolsters the conclusion that EPCRA authorizes citi-
zen suits for past violations.
The linguistic evidence that the Gwaltney court cited to bar
citizen suits for past violations of the CWA does not exist in
EPCRA. In Gwaltney, because the party alleged the "to be in
violation" language was not dispositive, the Supreme Court ob-
served that "[one of the most striking indicia of the prospective
orientation of the citizen suit is the pervasive use of the present
tense" throughout the relevant section. 47 The Court cited four
present-tense phrases in the CWA's citizen suit section beyond
the "to be in violation" clause."' No such pattern exists in cor-
responding portions of EPCRA.
First, EPCRA consistently uses language that includes retro-
spective violations when it authorizes public enforcement. In the
Atlantic States Legal Foundation, Inc. v Whiting Roll-Up Door Manufacturing
Corp., 772 F Supp 745 (W D NY 1991); Delaware Valley Toxics Coalition v Kurz-Hastings,
Inc., 813 F Supp 1132 (E D Pa 1993); Williams v Leybold Technologies, Inc., 784 F Supp
765 (N D Cal 1992).
'" United Musical Instruments, 61 F3d at 477.
'" Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990 § 707(g), Pub L No 101-548, 104 Stat 2574,
2683, codified at 42 USC § 7604(aXl), (3).
I" United Musical Instruments, 61 F3d at 477.
147 484 US at 59.
148 Id.
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CWA, states may file civil actions for a violation "which is occur-
ring in another state and is causing an adverse impact on the
public health .... 149 In EPCRA, provisions authorizing civil
actions by state and local governments parrot the "failure to
complete and submit" language from the statute's citizen suit
provisions and refer to sections containing temporal referenc-
es."W The statute authorizes citizen suits against the EPA and
state officials with similar language.'51
Second, EPCRA defines who can sue differently from the
CWA. The CWA defines a citizen as "a person or persons having
an interest which is or may be adversely affected."152 EPCRA
defined a person without including any temporal elements,"
implicitly limiting standing qualifications to the minimal consti-
tutional requirements.TM
Third, while other statutes deal with complex problems con-
cerning environmental degradation, EPCRA is aimed at informa-
tion dissemination. The simplicity of EPCRA's demands could
logically support more rigid enforcement of its requirements,
including past violations. The CWA and the CAA, for example,
concern complex caps on ongoing waste discharges and air pollu-
tion. "'55 In contrast, EPCRA requires paperwork filing." One
could fairly observe that these goals lead to different enforcement
mechanisms-including not only the ubiquitous injunctions, but,
more importantly, broad monetary penalties.
Fourth, since Gwaltney, Congress has altered the context in
which courts interpret each act's notice provision. Gwaltney noted
that under the CWA citizens must notify the EPA, the alleged
violator, and the state "in which the alleged violation occurs" of
their intent to sue 60 days before a suit is filed.'57 EPCRA con-
tains the same disputed language.5  The Gwaltney Court ruled
that (1) the notice provision would become "gratuitous" if viola-
tors were not allowed a period to come into compliance without
liability, and (2) permitting past violation suits would "change
149 33 USC § 1365(h).
" 42 USC § 11046(aX2). Compare 42 USC § 11046(aXl).
... 42 USC § 11046(aX1XB)-(D).
152 33 USC § 1365(g).
1 42 USC § 11049(7).
'u See John E. Nowak and Ronald D. Rotunda, Constitutional Law § 2.12(f) at 71-90
(West 5th ed 1995).
' See 33 USC § 1251 (CWA); 42 USC § 7401 (CAA).
42 USC §§ 11021(d), 11022(aX2), 11023(a).
57 Gwaltney, 484 US at 59, citing 33 USC § 1365(b)(1)(A)(ii).
' 42 USC § 11046(dX1).
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the nature of the citizens' role from interstitial to potentially
intrusive."'59
Still, Congress's 1990 Clean Air Act amendments, as noted
earlier, explicitly permitted past violation suits while keeping
notice requirements, rendering Gwaltney's logic a less "compel-
ling" interpretation of congressional intent."e The realistic view
that a notice period represents a period for not only federal pre-
emption but litigation coordination, investigation, settlement
negotiation, and liability mitigation6'-and not merely amnes-
ty-carries common-sensical weight.162 While Congress can
grant safe harbors, post-1990 courts would err in assuming that
Congress implicitly created one in EPCRA simply by making a
citizen wait to sue. Further, little risk exists that citizens-who
must allow government agencies first crack at any suit, have
fewer resources, and are always subject to federal intervention in
their legal dispute-will usurp state power. As the next Part
discusses, citizen suits exist largely because the government
needs, not fears, their assistance.
Two additional structural points merit discussion. First, as
the Seventh Circuit has noted,"S EPCRA uses the past tense in
its venue section in referring to the district where "the alleged
violation occurred.""' In comparison, te CWA's venue provi-
sion refers to actions being brought where the source of excess
pollution "is located."' The CWA's choice of venue does not
necessarily imply that all violations are ongoing, but the distinc-
tion between it and EPCRA adds credence to the arguments for
allowing past violation actions.
Additionally, the Sixth Circuit's insistence that the EPA can
address past violations while citizens cannot,' can be rebutted.
The court based its conclusion on the language of EPCRA's civil
and administrative penalty provision.'67 This argument is en-
tirely misplaced. First, the Sixth Circuit referred to sections of
the statute that are irrelevant to the past violations question.
They refer to the civil liability of any person "who violates any
1'9 484 US at 60-61.
160 Steel Co., 90 F3d at 1244.
161 This is especially relevant under EPCRA since civil penalties for reporting viola-
tions are assessed daily. 42 USC § 11045(cX3).
162 See Steel Co., 90 F3d at 1244.
16 Id.
' 42 USC § 11046(bXl).
'6 33 USC § 1365(cX1).
16 United Musical Instruments, 61 F3d at 475.
167 42 USC § 11045(c)(1), (4).
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requirement" of the law and the imposition of administrative
penalties equal to "any civil penalty for which a person is lia-
ble."" But "violates" does not refer only to ongoing violations.
That liability is ongoing does not transform the past nature of
the violations. In addition, the Sixth Circuit ignores the fact that
the EPCRA citizen suit provision incorporates all of the civil
penalty provisions by reference."' Thus, EPCRA does not deny
"broad power" to citizens while granting it to the EPA.
In sum, no basis exists to undermine application of EPCRA's
citizen suit provision to past violations. No "pervasive use" of the
present tense can be found, and the preponderance of clauses
that refer to past acts urge support for the Seventh Circuit's
conclusions.
C. The Social Origins and Policy Justifications of EPCRA
Congress passed EPCRA to increase the nation's ability to
respond quickly and effectively to emergencies and to enable
citizens to become aware of dangers. Allowing courts to excuse
violators' failures to comply with deadlines does not comport with
this intent.
Omnipresent during EPCRA's development was the Bhopal
tragedy.70 The statute's first incarnation appeared only months
after the Indian chemical accident. 71 Throughout EPCRA's con-
sideration, its supporters described the accident not as "an aber-
ration of Third World management and technology" but as a
realistic possibility in the United States.Y12 Congress designed
EPCRA to "improve our ability to respond to these incidents."'73
Thus, every section of EPCRA related to emergency plan-
ning. EPCRA established planning groups, 74 required the devel-
opment of plans,' 75 and mandated immediate notification of offi-
cials17 --even via 911177-in the case of emergencies. Each of
168 Id.
16 42 USC § 11046(c) ("The district court shall have jurisdiction ... against an owner
or operator of a facility.., to impose any civil penalty provided for violation of that
requirement....").
"o Statement of Senator Lautenberg, 131 Cong Rec S 11663-65 (Sept 18, 1985); David
J. Abell, Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know: The Toxics Release Invento-
ry, 47 SMU L Rev 581 (1994).
1' See Superfund Improvement Act of 1985, S Rep No 99-11, 99th Cong, 1st Sess 8-15
(1985).
172 Statement of Senator Lautenberg, 131 Cong Rec S 18388-89 (Dec 19, 1985).
,73 Statement of Senator Lautenberg, 131 Cong Rec at S 11664 (cited in note 170).
174 42 USC § 11001.
175 42 USC § 11003.
176 42 USC § 11004.
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EPCRA's required documents had to be filed by fixed dates, 78
regularly updated,'17 and made available to the public."s And
the most important type of reported information--concerning
amounts of chemicals released into the environment-had to be
available on-line.''
The historical background leading to EPCRA does not justify
interpreting congressional intent to endorse grace periods for
violators, a necessary consequence of abrogating citizens' ability
to sue for past violations. The Sixth Circuit nonetheless conclud-
ed from EPCRA's legislative history only "that Congress thought
it important that the public receive the required informa-
tion." 2 Even if this objective was delayed, the Sixth Circuit
reasoned, citizens eventually received the information, and the
EPA could use its discretion to decide whom to punish." This
view devalues Congress's aims and turns a blind eye to the reali-
ties of environmental enforcement.
First, filing forms is not equivalent to filing timely forms.
The former act imposes impediments on planners and emergency
officials similar to those imposed by a non-filer. As discussed in
Part L.A of this Comment, Congress referred to the dates for
required documents in the citizen suit authorization section. This
reference is strong evidence of the importance of timely compli-
ance. Moreover, as district courts have noted, delays in filing
forms can prevent a community from having the up-to-date emer-
gency response plans Congress envisioned.'
Such a scenario is not fanciful. Recall Facility X. The local
fire department and emergency planners know little about the
current nature, amount, location, or disposal of chemicals used by
Facility X. Would it thus come as a surprise when officials omit
Facility X from, or fail to alter their treatment of it in, their
emergency plans and drills? When Facility X calls 911 for the
first time, the community may indeed face a Bhopal-type situa-
tion.
17' 42 USC § 11004(b).
178 42 USC §§ 11021-11023.
179 Id.
"0 42 USC § 11044.
181 42 USC § 11023(j).
182 United Musical Instruments, 61 F3d at 477.
" Id.
"s See Atlantic States Legal Foundation, Inc. v Whiting Roll-Up Door Manufacturing
Corp., 772 F Supp 745, 750-51 (W D NY 1991); Williams v Leybold Technologies, Inc., 784
F Supp 765, 768 (N D Cal 1992).
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In addition, without timely filed information, citizens would
not have swift access to information about their communities.
The required computer database and public documents would not
represent the full picture. Citizens could not research, lobby, or
speak out on environmental issues intelligently without these
facts. Eventual filing does not cure these delays. Congress in-
tended citizens to have ready access to information." To that
end it allowed only for limited departures from reporting dead-
lines."s
Further, the Sixth Circuit erred in suggesting that EPCRA
"leaves to the EPA, with its broad perspective on the entire spec-
trum of enforcement of compliance, discretion to determine those
violators whose conduct warrants such penalties." 1 7 Putting
aside this statement's inaccuracy as a matter of statutory inter-
pretation," it ignores the valid purposes leading to the inclu-
sion of citizen suits in EPCRA.
EPCRA authorized citizen suits precisely because Congress
did not expect the EPA to find all violators. As one federal envi-
ronmental official described, there are simply too many violations
"out there" for the government to prosecute. 89 Thus, statutes
such as EPCRA create a web of enforcement among governments
and private citizens. Every document is filed at different levels of
government," ° governmental entities can sue each other, 9'
the EPA can assess fines and file its own actions,9 2 and citi-
' See, for example, Statement of Representative Edgar, 132 Cong Reec H 9595 (Oct 8,
1986):
Frankly, my concerns rest with the families that live in the shadow of those
chemical and manufacturing plants. I have put myself in their shoes and have
fought for a program that looks after their needs. This legislation gets us well
on the path to the full disclosure they deserve.
" See 42 USC § 11023(i) (allowing the EPA, under very limited circumstances, to
modify frequency of release form filings).
", United Musical Instruments, 61 F3d at 477.
I See discussion in Part II.B.
'89 Statement of William Cohen, Chief of the General Litigation Section of the Land
and Natural Resources Division of the US Department of Justice, quoted in Donald R.
Hodas, Enforcement of Environmental Law in a Triangular Federal System" Can Three
Not Be a Crowd When Enforcement Authority is Shared by the United States, the States,
and Their Citizens?, 54 Md L Rev 1552, 1560 n 36 (1995). Senator Muskie specifically ob-
served that governments were not adequately enforcing environmental laws when he
supported the first citizen suit provisions in the Clean Air Act. Statement of Senator
Muskie, 116 Cong Rec S 42382 (Dec 18, 1970).
ISo 42 USC §§ 11021-11023.
191 42 USC § 11046(aX2XC).
19 42 USC § 11045.
395] EPCRA CITIZEN SUITS FOR PAST VIOLATIONS 417
zens can sue violators.'93 Governmental actors retain preemp-
tion rights, but few obstacles lie in the path of a citizen who
discovers a violation. This path may increase costs,'" perhaps
raising questions about the wisdom of methods provided by Con-
gress, but not their validity. Thus, especially in a statute such as
EPCRA involving a national scope and observable paperwork
deadlines, citizens properly play an important role in enforce-
ment.
D. Additional Perspectives on EPCRA
Courts should consider practical reality alongside text, struc-
ture, and policy in interpreting EPCRA. Unless courts permit
broad private actions for past violations, EPCRA citizen suits will
disappear. If citizens can only sue for ongoing violations, EPCRA
would offer no financial incentives or practical possibility of suc-
cess.
Although EPCRA's opponents predicted the statute would
explode the toxic tort industry and cause sensationalism, the
result has been different.'95 Few citizen suits were filed under
EPCRA during its first decade." The suits filed were instituted
by small environmental groups that, as the statute intended,
discovered that companies in their own backyard had not fied
documents. 97
To understand the economic realities, the example of Facility
X remains helpful. The example assumed Citizen A "discovered"
the facility had not filed EPCRA documents. But such a discovery
does not come without costs. In Delaware Valley Toxics Coalition
v Kurz-Hastings, for example, the plaintiff completed a computer
study of Philadelphia-area EPCRA compliance, purchased items,
and invested more than 250 hours of time to find violators.'"
EPCRA seeks to promote information dissemination, but gather-
42 USC § 11046(a).
14 See Harold J. Krent and Ethan G. Shenkman, Of Citizen Suits and Citizen
Sunstein, 91 Mich L Rev 1793, 1812-13 n 74 (1993).
" Sidney M. Wolf, Fear and Loathing About the Public Right-to-Know: The Surpris-
ing Success of the Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act, 11 J Land Use
& Envir L 217, 244-46, 277-80 (1996).
196 Id at 277-80.
19 Id.
19 813 F Supp 1132, 1135 (E D Pa 1993).
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ing such information requires substantial research'" because
the EPA's database does not identify non-filers.2"
On the other side of the coin, prior to a suit, what incentives
does Facility X have to file EPCRA forms? Criminal penalties
apply only to emergency and trade secret provisions."°1 As dis-
cussed in Part II.C, an overworked EPA or state agency will not
likely begin proceedings against Facility X for paperwork viola-
tions unless Facility X's failure is egregious. According to one
early estimate, 30 percent of American companies required to
comply with EPCRA fail to do so each year.2"
Thus, what does allowing citizen suits, past or present, add
to this mix? The answer is financial fear. Although the EPA may
not have the resources or desire to prosecute Facility X's viola-
tions after they are discovered, citizens may. Facility X filed its
release form two and a half months late-one and a half months
after Citizen A gave notice. That makes them potentially liable
under EPCRA for up to $3.75 million.13 The EPA has devel-
oped a policy that can reduce the penalties they seek in EPCRA
actions,' but without the EPA as a party, the potential liabili-
ty remains enormous.
This potential mega-penalty has a beneficial impact on citi-
zen suits. Congress very likely included not only injunctions and
orders, but penalties, as relief under EPCRA to create an ex ante
incentive for timely compliance. First, the liability gets the atten-
tion of violators. Although an EPCRA trial may not lead to a
verdict for these maximum amounts, the possibility often facili-
tates settlement negotiations.2"' Second, settlements can in-
clude many positive elements for the plaintiff. In addition to
assuring compliance and extracting penalty payments, settle-
ments often impose extra compliance requirements for viola-
"' See Robert W. Shavelson, EPCRA, Citizen Suits and the Sixth Circuit's Assault of
the Public's Right-to-Know, 2 Alb L Envir Outlook 29, 35 (Fall 1995).
2'0 Id.
201 42 USC § 11045(bX4), (d)(2).
2 General Accounting Office, Toxic Chemicals - EPA's Toxic Release Inventory Is
Useful But Can Be Improved 50 (GPO 1991). EPA enforcement through fines and noncom-
pliance notices has grown in later years, however. EPA Fines 42 Companies $1.65 Million,
Cites Failure to Report Toxic Discharges, 20 Envir Rptr (BNA) 496 (1989).
42 USC §§ 11045(c), 11046(c). This total incorporates violations for failing to file
with either the state or the EPA, each carrying fines of $25,000 per day. Moreover, this
estimate may be conservative. A company not filing release reports may not have filed in-
ventory reports, adding liability.
' See Karl S. Coplan, Private Enforcement of Federal Pollution Control Laws: The
Citizen Suit, in ALI-ABA, Environmental Litigation 1033, 1053 (1996).
=' Wolf, 11 J Land Use & Envir L at 271 (cited in note 195).
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tors2' and demand contributions to environmentally beneficial
entities including EPCRA-monitoring groups.2 7 Moreover,
courts can use the "costs of litigation" recovery provision under
EPCRA to award enforcement, research, and discovery costs. 8
Thus, citizen groups, especially those that make local EPCRA re-
search part of their mission, can achieve environmental as well
as financial rewards from citizen suits.
But consider the impact on this hypothetical if United Musi-
cal Instruments was correct in precluding suits for past violations
of EPCRA. The release form in the example, filed on September
15, was "completed and submitted" prior to the earliest date on
which Citizen A could have filed suit.'° Thus, no citizen suit
would be allowed. As a result, Citizen A's costs could not be reim-
bursed, and Citizen A could not seek punishment or additional
compliance measures. Furthermore, it is unlikely that the EPA
would choose to spend its limited resources on a violation already
cured.2
10
This hypothetical suggests the disastrous consequences of
the Sixth Circuit's approach. If the notice period provision gives
violators a window of opportunity to escape liability, there is no
incentive to file on time. In fact, compliance costs create a
disincentive for timely filing. This cannot be what the authors of
the law wanted.
Thus, the Seventh Circuit's practical observations carry great
weight. In Steel Co., the court noted the Sixth Circuit's view
would render citizen suits "virtually meaningless":
EPCRA creates a structure that encourages private
citizens to invest the resources necessary to uncover
violations of the Act .... If citizen suits could be fully
prevented by 'completing and submitting' forms, howev-
er late, citizens would have no real incentive to incur
the costs of learning about EPCRA, investigating sus-
pected violators, and analyzing information. Put simply,
See id at 280; Note, The Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act:
A Tool for Toxic Release Reduction in the 90's, 3 Buff Envir L J 1, 22-23 (1995).
2 See Wolf, 11 J Land Use & Envir L at 280 (cited in note 195); Note, 3 Buff Envir L
J at 20 (cited in note 206).
Steel Co., 90 F3d at 1244-45.
42 USC § 11046(dXl).
210 On the EPA's discretion and the incentives for citizens to sue generally, see Hodas,
54 Md L Rev 1552 (cited in note 189).
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if citizens can't sue, they can't recover the costs of their
efforts.21
The result of the Sixth. Circuit's decision, the Steel Co. court
asserted, would be to shift the cost of EPCRA compliance from
Facility X to Citizen A. This would cause private enforcement to
"drop off," an idea "impossible to reconcile with the clearly ex-
pressed intent of Congress, or with the very existence of the
citizen enforcement provisions."2 2
If these consequences materialized, private enforcement of
EPCRA would no longer exist. In combination with Supreme
Court interpretations of other environmental statutes,213 citi-
zens would often be without recourse. Thus, absent the redraft-
ing of relevant statutes, only governmental entities would remain
to enforce environmental laws, which they have admitted is a
monumental and likely impossible task in today's budget-con-
scious and violation-filled world.
CONCLUSION
EPCRA represents a novel and important tool in environ-
mental law. It attempts to harness local citizens and public opin-
ion to encourage widespread environmental planning, awareness,
and, ultimately, safety. In accordance with these goals, a careful
reading of EPCRA leads to the conclusion that citizens must have
the right to sue for not only ongoing, but also wholly past, viola-
tions. The statute's language differs from that used in other envi-
ronmental citizen suit provisions by not using present tense
verbs. EPCRA specifically includes references to provisions with
fixed deadlines for compliance that, given the context of the
statute's intent, must be given meaning through adequate en-
forcement. Furthermore, permitting citizen suits for past viola-
tions preserves the statute's effectiveness and practical use by
providing the necessary financial incentives for private monitor-
ing.
211 90 F3d at 1244.
212 Id at 1245.
213 See Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd. v Chesapeake Bay Foundation, 484 US 49 (1987).
